Meanwhile, the rapid diffusion of AI is reshaping the foundations of productivity on the economic front, even as it forces a reconsideration of regulation, accountability, and governance in the social sphere.
Yet these developments should not be understood as isolated or episodic phenomena. Rather, they appear to be the structural risks during a transitional period in which the very lens through which the world is viewed is being reorganised. They reflect a confluence of international politics, economics, technology, and institutional change. For corporate management, the critical tasks lie in calmly assessing the interactions among these forces, clarifying the likelihood and impact of these global risks, defining ex-ante and ex-post responses, and integrating them coherently into business strategy.
This article highlights nine major risks that ASEAN companies are likely to face in 2026 and discusses the managerial perspectives required to understand and address them in structural terms.
[Global Risks for ASEAN Companies in 2026]
1. Protracted US–China Rivalry and Decoupling
2. The Rising Presence of Emerging Powers
3. Regional Instability in ASEAN
4. Knock-on Effects of Major Global Conflicts on ASEAN
5. AI-Driven Disinformation in the US Midterm Elections
6. Uncertainty Regarding China’s Economic Outlook
7. Measuring the Value-Added Productivity of AI
8. Drift and Fragmentation in Climate Action
9. Intensifying Regulation of Big Tech
US-China rivalry is no longer a transient source of tension; it is becoming embedded as a structural and secular risk to the global economy. The advent of the post-globalisation era is overturning long-standing assumptions about international division of labour premised on efficiency, while deepening the formation of economic blocs anchored in national security. Critical and foundational technologies such as AI, quantum computing, and advanced semiconductors are now viewed as the core of national competitiveness, prompting both Washington D.C. and Beijing to deploy a full arsenal of export controls, investment screening and industrial subsidies to secure technological advantage. In practice, many global corporations are already building self-contained value chains both within and outside China. Yet the existing interdependence — across both hardware and software — remains substantial, and maintaining these parallel structures entails significant costs.
As a result, global companies face new cost and risk factors defined by regulations that actively induce decoupling. Manufacturing and R&D footprints, data flows and even financial transactions must be aligned with regulatory regimes on both sides, in some cases forcing a fundamental redesign of business models.
Supply chains are increasingly bifurcating into a “US bloc” and a “China bloc,” intensifying pressure on so-called “middle countries” — often in the Global South — to choose sides. Governments are compelled to strike difficult diplomatic balances between economic interests and security imperatives, rendering the international order ever more fluid. At the same time, multilateral institutions such as the World Trade Organization, which once played a stabilising role in shaping and sustaining free trade are their ability to influence and regulate, replaced by competing regulatory initiatives led by individual economic blocs. Capital flows are also polarising, with the reassertion of dollar hegemony alongside the gradual emergence of a digital renminbi adding further complexity.
For ASEAN, this decoupling dynamic creates both opportunities (demand) and constraints. As global firms build value chains outside China, export driven manufacturers in ASEAN are possible beneficiaries of more relocation demand, with the caveat that projects are designed around dual compliance, potentially requiring splitting of manufacturing and R&D footprints by distinct US-linked and China-linked customers and technology stacks. At the same time, ASEAN is likely to face more pressure to pick sides on standards and policies as supply chains divide into US- and China-blocs, while also having to keep an eye on the middle countries that will gain bargaining power as a result of the split. Capital decisions will also become more sensitive to currency and payment rails, with dollar-based finance likely to remain dominant in the face of a growing uptake of a digital renminbi.
India, Indonesia, Brazil, Turkey and Mexico are rapidly gaining prominence as the next growth pillars of the global economy. As US-China decoupling advances, some of these countries have become key beneficiaries of “China plus one” strategies, fostering manufacturing clusters. India seeks expansion in semiconductors and smartphone assembly; Indonesia is building an integrated EV battery ecosystem anchored in nickel resources; Mexico’s geopolitical position and the USMCA are accelerating nearshoring and deepening integration with North American supply chains. Brazil’s dominance as a resource supplier to both blocs continues.
Expanding domestic markets provide a second growth pillar. In all these emerging economies, rising middle classes, urbanisation, and digital payment infrastructure support consumption-led growth models, lending to greater resilience against external shocks. Nonetheless, policy predictability and transparency remain key concerns, and regulatory change risk continues to shape investment decisions.
These countries are also emerging as non-aligned middle states that maintain security interests and investment ties with the United States while preserving trade and infrastructure cooperation with China or Russia. As the power rivalry intensifies, their bargaining power is likely to rise and reshape regional and global world orders, reflecting the multi-polarisation of the global economy and significantly influencing post globalisation supply chain configurations.
For ASEAN, the rise of non-aligned middle states has profound implications. While emerging markets such as India, Brazil, etc. offer dynamic, exciting growth opportunities, their rising bargaining power might force ASEAN companies to localize operations significantly in these centres, thereby demanding a relook into future investment plans, organization structures and local partnerships. ASEAN companies can also leverage these locations to strengthen their global bases for research, manufacturing and services (e.g. Turkey as a regional manufacturing hub, India as global shared services centre). Since many of such emerging markets have a strong protectionist slant, ASEAN companies may need to increasingly work with policymakers to avoid unfavourable tariff or investment restrictions.
Instability in ASEAN is driven by domestic political conflict, street mobilisation and cross border security frictions. In Myanmar, the civil war that followed the 2021 coup has led to controversial election proceedings that may cement the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party as next leaders. In Indonesia and the Philippines, large youth-led protests have taken place in multiple cities over economic and socio-political concerns underpinned by deeply entrenched corruption. In Thailand, upcoming elections are unlikely to lead to short-term political stability or a stable administration, with the path to forming a coalition government unclear, against a backdrop of border conflicts with Cambodia. The South China Sea remains a persistent flashpoint, especially between the Philippines and China.
For companies in ASEAN, such instability demands a review of short- and mid-term business plans, project pipelines, new ventures and supply chains to reassess assumptions, implications and exposure to geopolitical risks on a country-by-country basis. This lends to adverse impact on timelines, supply stability and regulatory certainty – financing and contracting will also see high risk premiums priced in and longer decision tenures. However, in the context of regional volatility, ASEAN conglomerates stand to gain, with opportunities to play a major role in stabilising the domestic economy and improving society through leveraging traditional close ties with local administrations, multi-business synergies and strong financial standing to attract capital.
Outside ASEAN, the main conflicts shaping global risks are the Russia Ukraine war, the Middle East conflict, North-Asia tensions and other active and potential conflicts in places such as Sudan, Venezuela or Congo. These tensions persist because core political disputes remain unresolved, and in some cases conflict spills into trade routes and sanctions, spreading the impact beyond the battlefield.
Energy and shipping markets are likely to remain reactionary to headlines – the Red Sea remains a key uncertainty as route diversions and attack risk persist and Taiwan Strait tensions ebb and flow as drills intensify, or incidents occur near major ports and sea lanes. Persistent perception of high inflation and its perceived linkages to Russia-Ukraine and other cross-border conflicts hold the potency of disrupting domestic politics in far-flung markets.
For ASEAN companies, the impact shows up in the form of higher and more volatile costs and demand uncertainty. Disruptions to shipping and insurance have a knock-on effect on logistics and operating costs, which are passed through into prices of affected goods and services. Risks arising from the Taiwan Strait will impact firms exposed to Northeast Asia trade and regional production networks, where tensions may disrupt shipping routes and high value intermediate flows across multiple sectors. On the other hand, such an environment also creates opportunities for ASEAN countries to attract capital inflows if correctly positioned as stable and neutral hubs. Some countries such as Singapore are structurally better placed to capture diversion flows and assume regional coordination roles, with said opportunities available to the other ASEAN nations contingent on the near and mid-term outcomes of internal instability and domestic political shifts.
The 2026 US midterm elections are likely to mark a critical inflection point in what might be termed as the “AI information warfare,” testing the resilience of democratic systems. Advances in generative AI have automated propaganda activities that once required substantial human and financial resources, enabling the mass production and dissemination of disinformation at minimal cost. Highly realistic synthetic audio and video, along with continuously generated, micro-targeted false narratives, have begun to erode the infrastructure of electoral communication.
In the United States, where regulations governing political advertising, transparency obligations, and social media usage vary widely by state, a unified federal response remains difficult. This patchwork regulatory landscape risks creating loopholes readily exploited by malicious actors. As trust in traditional media continues to erode, voters face increasing cognitive burdens in discerning truth from falsehood, and the public deliberative space at the heart of democracy is showing signs of institutional fatigue.
Foreign actors — including China, Russia, and Iran — are further refining AI-enabled techniques to amplify social cleavages within the United States. Polarisation obscures detection of foreign interference and magnifies the impact of information manipulation. Domestically, legislative and judicial progress on AI regulation remains slow, leaving platform companies caught between strengthening self-regulation and safeguarding freedom of expression. Any erosion of trust in electoral legitimacy would reverberate through policy implementation and international leadership. The 2026 midterms thus risk exposing deep structural vulnerabilities of democracy in the AI era, casting a long shadow over the stability of US politics.
For ASEAN, policy volatility from the US is likely to persist regardless of election outcomes – prevailing policy narratives in the US are unlikely to reverse, which includes a stronger protectionist and nationalist stance, continued decoupling and polarization and policy signalling shaped by domestic voter pressures. While rhetoric and intensity may shift, the underlying direction is unlikely to reverse in the near term. Ultimately, ASEAN largely remains a policy taker and ASEAN companies therefore need to closely watch the US election outcome for signals on pace and emphasis of this direction which will impact the region through multiple channels, including tariffs, shifting trade and investment restrictions, immigration policy, reshoring of production, and scrutiny of the region as a potential transshipment and compliance risk. While the exact mix remains uncertain, spillovers into trade, supply chains, and investment planning are likely to persist.
China’s economic outlook remains uncertain, driven by policy ambiguity and weak confidence, with the property downturn amplifying debt risks for Local Government financing vehicles (LGFVs) and potential financial spillovers. As land-sale revenues collapse and local fiscal foundations weaken, many local governments have accumulated debt to sustain infrastructure investment and employment. With the contraction of the property market and the deterioration of collateral values, LGFVs’ repayment capacity is increasingly in question. The spillover into the financial sector risks triggering a classic credit-deflation dynamic, embedding downward pressure on growth.
Beijing has so far refrained from offering a clear local-government bailout scenario, seeking to curb moral hazard rooted in expectations of central rescue. The resulting policy uncertainty has further reinforced caution among economic actors. Stagnant property prices — critical given the dominance of real estate in household asset portfolios — are suppressing consumption. While service consumption is relatively resilient, demand for durable goods is softening. Combined with excess production capacity, this raises the risk of deepening deflationary pressures, reinforcing uncertainty over China’s medium term growth path.
Rising youth unemployment constitutes another structural risk. Restructuring of the education sector, and subdued private sector investments have constrained job creation. Moreover, demand for while-collar labour has proven insufficient to absorb the large inflow of new graduates. As a result, social frustration is becoming more pronounced. The government faces a difficult dilemma between maintaining social stability and sustaining growth. While industrial policy is shifting from a manufacturing powerhouse toward technological hegemony — focusing resources on semiconductors, EVs, and AI — heightened external restrictions leave the growth trajectory of these sectors uncertain. Overall, China risks slipping into a prolonged low-growth trap, exerting persistent downward pressure on the global economy.
For ASEAN, a weaker China can translate into more Chinese firms pushing outward. As China’s domestic demand softens and overcapacity persists, Chinese companies are more likely to expand into ASEAN through exports or localised partial investment to find growth and absorb domestic capacity potentially via dumping. This raises competitive pressure on ASEAN firms through cheaper imports, faster capacity additions and margin compression particularly in China-dominated sectors, such as industrial materials and intermediate goods, machinery and electronics, consumer durables, clean tech value chains such as solar, batteries and EV related components, as well as consumer goods and F&B products. The broader shock then could propagate through ASEAN economies through weaker prices, inventory build ups, delayed investment and knock-on effects on the broad SME sector if left unprotected.
Discourse on the AI bubble references the growing gap between very high expectations and spending and the slower pace of proven returns and is a theme increasingly covered in global commentary. Trillions of dollars are being committed to chips, data centres and power, while many companies still struggle to move from pilots to scaled impact and clear ROI. This gap is amplified by financing and accounting choices that keep some AI data centre debt off balance sheets, masking leverage as the buildout accelerates. In ASEAN, this dynamic is visible in Singapore’s heavy cloud and AI infrastructure investment, Malaysia and Thailand’s rapid data centre expansion tied to foreign hyperscalers and Indonesia’s push to attract AI related capex despite ongoing questions around power, skills, and utilisation rates.
In the near future, analysts widely expect a separation between winners that demonstrate measurable outcomes and players that cannot, rather than a sudden collapse. Some reports frame 2026 as a transition point where inflated narratives give way to economic measurement, with governments beginning to treat AI capital as a standard input into productivity and GDP analysis. In Singapore, early gains are visible in finance and professional services, where AI improves decision speed and output quality. In contrast, opinion pieces note that countries like Indonesia and Vietnam may see slower payoff as adoption is constrained by skills, data readiness, and firm size, even as infrastructure investment races ahead. Across the region, debate is shifting toward whether returns can catch up with capex and whether regulation on liability, bias, and transparency tightens, particularly in regulated sectors such as finance and healthcare.
Both opportunities and pressures exist for ASEAN companies. If the current AI euphoria proves closer to speculative fervour than a durable productivity revolution, hyperscalers may slow data centre and infrastructure commitments in markets such as Malaysia and Thailand. At the same time, tools that translate into tangible productivity gains should continue to diffuse into most if not all industries including finance, logistics, manufacturing planning and customer operations, albeit with firms will focus solely on trackable and measurable gains tied to AI adoption.
Two key constraints of AI expansion are energy and capital. Data centres are scaling toward gigawatt level power demand and utilities face uncertainty in committing to long term supply; rapid chip advances also raise the risk of asset obsolescence before returns are realised. In a correction scenario, spillovers can extend beyond a few large tech firms into the broader ecosystem that finances and supplies AI buildout.
In practical terms, ASEAN firms are equally pressured to stay at the adoption frontier as competitors embed AI into core workflows, with firms in Indonesia, Thailand, or Vietnam facing additional risks of not progressing meaningfully beyond pilots and proof-of-concepts. Firms should separate promise from hype by prioritising simple high-ROI use cases, building internal localised data and AI capabilities, avoiding large upfront bets tied to uncertain demand and strengthening governance on data, compliance, and model risk as customer and regulatory expectations rise.
Triggered in part by the Trump administration’s scepticism toward climate action, climate policy has entered a phase characterized by simultaneous acceleration and drift. Competition over renewable energy subsidies may expand clean technology adoption yet also fuel friction through the misuse of industrial policy. Security driven domestic manufacturing incentives distort international division of labour and deepen market fragmentation. Retaliatory subsidy dynamics among the US, Europe, and China risk undermining coherent decarbonization efforts.
Carbon border adjustment mechanisms (CBAMs) pursued by the EU and the United Kingdom have drawn criticism over extraterritorial discrimination and excessive reporting burdens, prompting some countries to explore their own versions. Without international alignment on emissions coefficients, coverage, and transition periods, such measures risk devolving into thinly veiled protectionism.
More troubling is the climate finance gap in developing countries. While adaptation and mitigation needs continue to grow, financial support from advanced economies and private capital remains limited. Frequent climate disasters and fiscal constraints hinder resilience building, entrenching inequality and geopolitical vulnerability in emerging economies.
Although national climate targets are politically ambitious, implementation capacity often lags. Bottlenecks in renewable deployment, grid expansion, and local consent fuel policy fatigue and widen the gap between goals and reality. Decarbonisation without coherent international execution risks eroding competitiveness and employment, even as inconsistent policy accelerates climate deterioration itself.
For ASEAN, this means climate policy is becoming closely linked to trade competitiveness. Export-oriented manufacturers face rising compliance and reporting demands as policies targeting imported Scope 3 emissions expand similar to the adoption of CBAM in Europe. Competitiveness will increasingly depend on the ability to minimise emissions down to the plant/factory level, track inputs autonomously and capture and disclose emissions data for different verification requirements reliably and accurately. Countries and firms that build strong systems for measurement and disclosure will face fewer trade barriers than those that treat reporting as a one-time exercise.
ASEAN is also positioned between competing subsidy policies and security-driven industrial strategies. While the region may benefit from supply-chain relocation and green investment, it also risks being viewed as a channel for emissions leakage or trade circumvention unless rules of origin, product tracking and auditing standards meet the mandatory standards of major export markets, mainly driven by EU regulations. The main challenge is to attract investment while preserving market access which requires clear country-level taxonomies, effective enforcement guidelines and expedited policy development to support clean infrastructure requirements.
Bridging the climate finance gap is especially important for ASEAN’s transition and resilience. Limited access to concessional finance and tight public budgets makes it difficult to fund new technologies, grid enhancements and the early retirement of high-emissions assets. In the near term, ASEAN should focus on firming up key regulations and policies to support investable project pipeline development, facilitate inflow of private capital via blended finance initiatives and improving grid readiness and permitting so that climate targets translate into real capacity.
Technology industries now exert unprecedented influence over national policy, placing Big Tech at the centre of regulatory pressure. In semiconductors, the United States is integrating export controls, outbound investment restrictions, and subsidies into a comprehensive industrial security strategy, while similar concerns around strategic dependence and technological sovereignty are beginning to shape policy thinking in parts of ASEAN. As AI training and inference drive explosive demand for compute, advanced chips have become strategic assets for both states and firms.
At the same time, rapid data centre expansion is straining power grids, renewable energy plans, land, and water resources. Hyperscalers are increasingly shaping national energy and infrastructure strategies, acting as quasi state actors. This dynamic is no longer confined to the US and Europe: in 2025, ASEAN governments including Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand have begun tightening oversight of data centre investment, grid access, online safety, and platform responsibilities, reflecting rising political sensitivity around power shortages, grid delays, and digital dependence. These pressures raise the likelihood of more regulation, localisation requirements, and targeted taxation of large-scale digital infrastructure.
Antitrust and platform-conduct scrutiny is also intensifying. In the US, advertising dominance and app store practices remain contested, while the EU’s Digital Markets Act has moved into enforcement. In ASEAN, 2025 has marked a shift from rulemaking to enforcement, with Indonesia fining Google over app store practices and imposing conditions on major platform acquisitions, Singapore expanding online safety powers over platforms, and Thailand and Vietnam advancing platform and data obligations. As a result, M&A is becoming a less reliable growth strategy for Big Tech, forcing firms to rethink how they acquire innovation and expand ecosystems in more regulated environments.
In ASEAN, such technologies are shifting from being treated as a growth engine to being treated as critical infrastructure, so regulation is shifting from guidance to enforcement. In 2025, Indonesia’s competition authority KPPU fined Google for Google Play billing practices and ordered Google to stop making Google Play Billing mandatory, signalling tougher platform-conduct enforcement. Singapore also moved to expand platform accountability for online harms through the Online Safety (Relief and Accountability) Bill, which creates an Online Safety Commission with powers to require action against harmful content and strengthen victim relief. Thailand issued new marketplace obligations under its digital platform services framework, with requirements published in July 2025 and taking effect from 31 Dec 2025, raising compliance expectations for platforms operating as online marketplaces. Vietnam passed a new Personal Data Protection Law in June 2025 that will take effect in 2026, signalling a tighter privacy regime that will raise compliance demands for cross border platforms and data heavy services.
Governments are also tying digital oversight to economic priorities, using Big Tech’s growing penetration as leverage to demand local investment, local partnerships, job creation, and capacity building and in some cases, local data handling and content related obligations. Compliance is no longer simply about risk management, but also increasingly part of the market access bargain, shaping where platforms can scale and how fast they can expand across the region. ASEAN companies stand to benefit via capital partnerships and joint ventures with global players, via provision of market access, firsthand data and local and regional operating capabilities.
A review of the risks confronting corporates in 2026 reveals striking similarities to the ten major risks which IGPI identified for 2025. This continuity suggests that decoupling, the erosion of multilateralism, challenges to the status quo by force, rising energy costs, the ascent of the Global South, and technology driven disruption are not transient shocks but medium-term structural risks inherent in an ongoing reordering of the global order. Viewed this way, proactive risk management is feasible, but only with a different managerial lens.
This includes viewing geopolitical risk not as an external backdrop but as a determinant of supply chains, technology, and financial strategy; moving beyond binary alignment with the US or China toward dynamic portfolio and footprint optimisation under persistent fragmentation; identifying competitive advantage arising from advanced technologies and regulatory reconfiguration; and treating supply chain redundancy and diversification not as costs but as sources of resilience based competitiveness.
What is required is not reactive crisis management or isolated preventive measures, but a redesign of management priorities and business portfolios premised on structural uncertainty. To anticipate and manage these risks effectively, five actions stand out for ASEAN companies.
1. | First, align major investments with long term megatrends rather than short cycle demand signals. Capital allocation should reflect structural drivers such as connectivity, profitable sustainability, demographic shifts and digitalisation, while reassessing legacy assets against rising geopolitical and regulatory risk. |
2. | Second, regionalise and localise operations to build operational agility. This includes strengthening decision-making in key revenue markets and source economies, redesigning supply chains with built in response scenarios and actively hedging major risk drivers rather than assuming stability. |
3. | Third, enhance internal market intelligence and scenario capabilities. This requires building internal capacity to run dynamic scenarios and impact models based on rapidly-changing geopolitical shifts, news feeds and policy intelligence to anticipate trends, derive implications and visualise impact on local and regional operations. |
4. | Fourth, proactively perform value creation & enhancement for existing and newly-acquired businesses. This entails granular and accurate performance tracking, regular review and recalibration of KPIs to reflect evolving market conditions and undertaking of value-accretive initiatives including deploying new technologies, enhancing local capabilities and leveraging organic and inorganic growth levers. |
Geopolitical uncertainty is not a passing trend—it is the new reality. Companies that continue to view it as an external risk rather than an integral part of strategy will find themselves constantly reacting rather than leading.
The businesses that succeed in this environment will be those that recognize:
– The era of globalization is over, and regionalization is the future.
– Geopolitical risks are not just threats—they are opportunities for those who anticipate them.
– Intelligence is only valuable if it is structured to drive long-term strategy, not just immediate reactions.
At IGPI, we specialize in helping businesses decode geopolitical complexity and turn risks into competitive advantages. In an era where uncertainty is the only constant, the ability to think ahead will define the winners of tomorrow.
To find out more about how IGPI Group can provide support for businesses, browse through our insight articles or get in contact with us.
Kohki Sakata, Partner of IGPI Group & CEO of IGPI Singapore
After joining Cap Gemini and Coca Cola, Kohki joined Revamp Corporation where he managed projects on global expansion and turnaround in various sectors including F&B, healthcare, retail, IT, etc. After joining IGPI, he has managed projects mainly on global expansion and cross border M&A in various sectors such as logistics, IT, telecom, retail, etc. In addition to his broad experience in implementing solutions that has been developed in Western countries, he has developed multiple methods to turnaround Asian companies with focus on setting clear vision and employee empowerment. Kohki has proven the practicality of these methods by turning around Asian companies not only as an advisor but also as senior management.
He graduated from Waseda University Department of Political Science and Economics and IE Business School.
Shivaji Das, Managing Director of IGPI Singapore
Shivaji has over 20 years of strategy consulting experience, specializing in New Business Models, Innovation Roadmaps, and Sustainability Journeys. He has worked with private and public sector clients across 25 countries in sectors like Technology, Semiconductors, Chemicals, Healthcare, Renewable Energy, and Construction. Previously, Shivaji was a Partner and Managing Director-APAC at Frost & Sullivan. His paper on Artificial Intelligence was presented at CAINE-2000 in Hawaii, USA. He is the author of seven acclaimed travel, art and business books including The Visible Invisibles and Rebels, Traitors, Peacemakers (both Penguin Random House), as well as The Great Lockdown: lessons learned during the pandemic from organizations around the world (Wiley, USA).
He is an alumnus of IIT Delhi and IIM Calcutta.
IGPI Group is a top management consulting & investment platform headquartered in Tokyo with a global footprint covering Singapore, Australia, Vietnam, Indonesia, China, Europe and India. The organization was established in 2007 by former members of the Industrial Revitalization Corporation of Japan (IRCJ), a USD 100 billion sovereign wealth fund focusing on turn-around projects in Japan. The group has 12 institutional investors, including Nomura Holdings, SMBC, KDDI, Recruit Holdings and Sumitomo Corporation. The group has three core businesses – management consulting, incubation & funding and major investments & business management. IGPI Group has approximately 8,500 employees on a consolidated basis.
IGPI Singapore was established in 2013 to provide end-to-end support, from strategy development to hands-on support, with capability of conducting M&A advisory as well as making principal investments. Leveraging long-standing relationships and trusted networks, IGPI Singapore is strongly connected with regional conglomerates across ASEAN, Japanese companies and major multinational corporations. Through these connections, the team has advanced initiatives and ventures with conglomerate partners, including smart city initiatives in Vietnam and Indonesia, among others, helping clients enter, grow, and transform across Southeast Asia.
* This material is intended merely for reference purposes based on our experience and is not intended to be comprehensive and does not constitute as advice. Information contained in this material has been obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but IGPI does not represent or warrant the quality, completeness, and accuracy of such information. All rights reserved by IGPI.
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